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Oblivious transfer (OT) is an important tool in cryptography. It serves as a subroutine to other
complex procedures of both theoretical and practical significance. Common attribute of OT proto-
cols is that one party (Alice) has to send a message to another party (Bob) and has to stay oblivious
on whether Bob did receive the message. Specific (OT) protocols vary by exact definition of the task
– in the all-or-nothing protocol Alice sends a single bit-string message, which Bob is able to read
only with 50% probability, whereas in 1-out-of-2 OT protocol Bob reads one out of two messages
sent by Alice. These two flavours of protocol are known to be equivalent. Recently a computation-
ally secure all-or-nothing OT protocol based on quantum states was developed in [A. Souto et. al.,
PRA 91, 042306], which however cannot be reduced to 1-out-of-2 OT protocol by standard means.
Here we present an elaborated reduction of this protocol which retains the security of the original.
I. INTRODUCTION
Oblivious transfer (OT) is a very important build-
ing block for various cryptographic protocols. Oblivious
transfer exists in two flavours. The first one, called all-
or-nothing OT provides a way to transfer a message from
Alice to Bob in such a way that Alice, as the sender, does
not know whether Bob did receive the message. More
precisely, Alice sends an encoded messagem to Bob. Bob
can decode the message with probability 12 . Importantly,
Alice shall not learn whether Bob was able to read the
message, thus the name oblivious.
It is a well-known fact that oblivious transfer cannot be
executed with unconditional security neither within the
classical domain, nor in quantum cryptography. Clas-
sically, the security is usually assured by computational
complexity arguments based on hardness of factoring (see
e.g. [1]). This, however makes the existing protocols vul-
nerable against attacks using quantum computers utiliz-
ing Shor’s factoring algorithm [2]. This naturally mo-
tivated the research towards quantum algorithms safe
against quantum attacks, such as the result of Souto et.
al. [4]. There the authors presented a quantum compu-
tationaly secure protocol for oblivious transfer under the
assumption of at most few-qubits measurements avail-
able.
Shortly afterwards He in [5] pointed out the incomplete
security of this protocol, mainly due to the fact that Al-
ice can assure in certain runs that Bob does not receive
the message. Souto et. al. replied [6] by arguing that
such a partially limited security of the protocol is not of
a significant hinder for its use. Although this statement
might be true for a subclass of utilizations of this obliv-
ious transfer protocol, for other classes this is certainly
not the case. One of the later examples is its possible uti-
lization in a reduction to the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer
protocol.
In 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, the task is slightly
modified: Alice sends two different messages m0 and m1.
The aim of the protocol is to assure that Bob is be able
to read exactly one them, whereas Alice shall not learn
which message was accessed by Bob. As shown by the
seminal work by Cre´peau [3], all-or-nothing OT and 1-
out-of-2 OT protocols are equivalent in the sense that
one can be efficiently used to implement the other. This
however only works if the starting protocol is perfectly se-
cure, which is not the case for the protocol introduced in
[4]. As correctly pointed out in [5], using the protocol of
Souto et. al. together with Cre´peaus reduction leads to
a complete loss of security. This might have two possible
causes – either the protocol of [4] is unsuitable for reduc-
tion to 1-out-of-2 OT protocol per se, or the Cre´peaus
reduction is not appropriate for this flawed protocol. In
this paper we show the latter is the case – we introduce an
improved reduction that maintains the level of security of
the original quantum protocol throughout the reduction.
This reduction has however a more general use: it shows
that the two flavors of OT protocols are equivalent even
in the presence of reasonably bounded security flaw.
The paper is organized as follows: in the second sec-
tion we briefly introduce the protocol from [4] as well as
where its security flaw comes from. In the third section
we introduce a subroutine protocol called element choos-
ing protocol, which allows a choice of an element from a
set shared between Alice and Bob in such a way that nei-
ther of them can influence the choice significantly. Inter-
estingly, this protocol is based on the flawed OT protocol
as well. The fourth section is devoted to the definition
of the 1-out-of-2 OT protocol itself and the fifth one to
its security analysis. In the last section we conclude our
findings.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Quantum oblivious transfer of Souto et. al.
First we briefly analyze the protocol introduced in [4].
Alice wants to send a message, here a bit string m, to
Bob, where Bob shall only with probability 12 learn the
2whole message, otherwise he shall not learn (almost) any-
thing. Analysis in [4] correctly shows that
1. If both Alice and Bob are honest, Bob receives the
message m with probability 12
2. Bob knows whether he got the message or not
3. Bob’s cheating is limited to a negligible probability
4. Alice does not know whether Bob received the mes-
sage if she was sending it honestly.
However, as correctly pointed out by He in [5], Alice
can perform a more sophisticated attack. She can decide
to use incorrect message in the last step of the protocol,
which causes Bob’s failure to obtain the correct message.
Bob cannot check whether Alice was honest in a sin-
gle run of the protocol. On the other hand, Alice cannot
increase the probability of Bob to obtain the correct mes-
sage above 1/2. Thus, every run of the protocol in which
Alice decides to cheat causes a decrease of the frequency
of Bob’s successes below 50%. Thus, Alice and Bob can
agree on a constant s being a security parameter. With
N repetitions of the protocol, Bob will terminate the co-
operation with Alice if he receives less than N2 − β
√
N
messages from Alice. If Alice wants to avoid termina-
tion of the protocol, she can act dishonestly only in up
to o(β)√
N
fraction of rounds, which can be made arbitrary
small with increasing N . As shown in [6], this is fine for
some applications of the protocol, but certainly not for
all. Next we show why the reduction to 1-out-of-2 OT
protocol due to Cre´peau [3] fails.
B. Failure of Cre´peaus reduction
The original reduction from all-or-nothing to 1-out-of-
2 oblivious transfer protocol from [3] works as follows:
1. Alice chooses at random N bits r1, r2, ..., rN .
2. For each of these N bits, Alice uses the all-or-
nothing OT protocol to disclose the bit ri to Bob.
3. Bob selects indices U = {i1, i2, ..., in} and V =
{in+1, in+2, ..., i2n} where n = N3 with U ∩ V = ∅.
Additionally, it is required that he knows ril for
each index il ∈ U . If he didn’t receive enough mes-
sages to select U , the protocol is terminated.
4. Bob sends (X,Y ) = (U, V ) if he wants to read m0
and (X,Y ) = (V, U) otherwise.
5. Alice computes k0 =
⊕
x∈X rx and k1 =
⊕
y∈Y ry .
6. Alice returns to Bob k0 ⊕m0 and k1 ⊕m1.
7. Bob computes
⊕
u∈U ru ∈ {k0, k1} and uses it to
get his secret bitm0 orm1 according to his previous
choice.
The main idea behind this reduction is hidden in the
step 3. If number N of the messages sent to Bob is large,
then it is highly improbable that he will receive less than
N
3 of the messages correctly. On the other hand, it is
equally improbable that he will receive more than 2N3 of
the messages correctly. Therefore, except for a marginal
probability, he will be able to produce a subset U con-
sisting of one third of rounds for which he knows all the
messages, but not both subsets U and V . Later Alice
encrypts two bits: one using the messages from U as the
key, the second using messages from V , knowing that
Bob will be able to decrypt only one. If the underly-
ing all-or-nothing OT is not compromised, Alice will not
know which bit Bob can decrypt, as she has no informa-
tion on which of the two sets consist of messages Bob has
successfully received.
However, as it was pointed out in [5], the situation
changes drastically if Alice can cheat, even to a small
extent, as in protocol of [4]. Alice can choose s rounds
where she knows Bob did not receive the correct mes-
sage. When Bob chooses rounds for the subset V , he can
choose roughly N6 indices of received messages (Bob re-
ceived roughly N2 messages, however he needs
N
3 of them
for U), but needs to select another roughly N6 indices
belonging to the messages he did not receive. Note that
each out of the s dishonest rounds will be chosen with
probability at least 13 . The probability that Bob chooses
at least one of these rounds as a member of V is thus can
be upper bounded as 1− (23)s, which quickly approaches
unity with increasing s.
If there is at least a single element from s in V , Al-
ice can with certainty learn whether (X,Y ) = (U, V )
or (X,Y ) = (V, U). Thus she can learn which bit Bob
intents to read with only negligible probability to be
caught.
C. Security Parameters
In what follows we analyse the security of different two
different protocols implemented with the help of flawed
OT protocol of [4], where the first analysed protocol is
used as a subroutine for the second one. We are in princi-
ple interested in three basic parameters: the probability
of the protocols to fail if both parties are honest, de-
noted pf , and the probabilities that Alice or Bob cheat
successfully, pA and pB respectively (with the other party
being honest). In what follows we evaluate the param-
eters of the protocol depending on these three output
parameters. To make the analysis easier to access, we
set pA = pB = ε and pf =
1
2 , to get a single security
parameter of the respective protocol.
III. ELEMENT CHOOSING PROTOCOL
First we introduce a subroutine protocol which uses a
possibly compromised all-or-nothing OT as a primitive
3and allows the parties to choose one element from some
large set T with cardinality NT . This set has two subsets
A ⊂ T and B ⊂ T ,A∩B = ∅ with NA and NB elements
respectively. Alice wins if an element from A is chosen
and Bob wins if an element from B is chosen. Our goal is
to have a protocol in which, with high probability, neither
of them wins, thus the chosen element does not belong
to either A or B.
The protocol is defined as follows:
1. Alice and Bob agree on a parameter α < 12 .
2. Parties count the elements of T and label them
with integers from 1 to NT .
3. Alice chooses at random NT messages
r1, r2, ..., rNT , where each of the messages consists
of ℓ bits. Alice will choose ℓ large enough so that
the probability of guessing ri will be low enough
in comparison to any other probability within the
protocol.
4. Alice sends each message ri with the all-or-nothing
OT protocol from [4].
5. Bob replies by publishing αNT messages he re-
ceived correctly. If he is not able to do so, the
protocol is aborted.
6. Indices of the published αNT messages are used as
the new set T . Alice and Bob repeat points 2-5 of
this protocol x times, in each round keeping an α
fraction of previously held messages; they will end
up with N = αxNT messages.
7. Alice randomly chooses one of these messages to be
the outcome of the protocol.
The protocol aborts if Bob announces incorrectly any
received message (which shall not happen for honest play-
ers) or if Bob is not able to announce αNT messages in
some round. At the end of the protocol, Alice and Bob
choose a single message ri.
A. The probability of failure
If the players are honest, the probability of failure in
the first round pf,1 is bounded from above by
pf,1 ≤ e−
(1−2α)2NT
4 , (1)
where we used the Chernoff bound for Pr(X ≤ αNT ). To
further simplify the notation we introduce a new symbol
ξ = 12 − α > 0, leading to a failure probability of
pf,1 ≤ e−ξ2NT . (2)
Recall that after the first stage, Alice and Bob will keep
αNT indices from the set T .
After x rounds, the probability of failure of the proto-
col will be upper bounded by the sum of probability of
failures in each respective run
pf ≤
x∑
i=1
pf,i =
x∑
i=1
e−ξ
2NT αi−1 = (3)
=
x∑
j=1
e−ξ
2Nα−j <
x∑
j=1
e−ξ
2N2j <
<
x∑
j=1
e−2jξ
2N <
∞∑
j=1
e−2jξ
2N <
< e−2ξ
2N
(
1− e−2ξ2N
)−1
< 2e−2ξ
2N ,
where we used e−2ξ
2N < 12 , which is a reasonable ex-
pectation, otherwise the protocol would fail with high
probability already in the first round.
B. Bob’s cheating
The probability of selecting an index from B in the
last round (after x round) is given by
NxB
αxNT
, where NxB
is the number of messages left from B in the last step of
the protocol. We can neglect the probability that Bob
can pretend to get a message he did not receive (which
can be achieved by choosing a sufficiently high ℓ). Then
the number of Bob’s winning messages is halved on av-
erage in each round, as the probability of each message
to reach Bob is 12 . Thus, the cheating probability of Bob
is bounded as
pB ≤ NB
(2α)xNT
. (4)
Bob has in fact no possibility of active cheating.
C. Alice’s cheating
Alice can cheat, if there is at least one message from
A left at the end of the protocol, by simply choosing this
message. The probability of this happening, if she is not
actively cheating in the previous runs of the protocol is
NA2−x
N . However, in each round she can reduce the num-
ber of messages she sends to Bob honestly. In this way
she can make sure that some messages ri, i /∈ A are not
received by Bob, thus increasing the chance that Bob will
choose some of the received messages from A for the next
round. Every such attempt increases the probability that
the protocol fails. Here we upper bound the probability
that Alice can cheat by showing that either her cheat-
ing probability, or the success probability of the whole
protocol, are strictly upper bounded.
Let us divide the possible strategies of Alice in each
round into two classes. The first class contains strategies
where she sends less than 2α fraction of all the messages
4in the given round honestly – we call these strategies hard
and the remaining ones we call soft. In a hard strategy,
in principle, Alice can send honestly only messages for
indices in A, however, provided that A is small enough,
the probability that Bob will correctly receive enough
messages would be extremely small.
For each round in which Alice uses a hard strategy, the
failure probability of the protocol will be multiplied by 12
(or higher) due to the fact that Bob will receive enough
messages for a reply with probability less than 12 . For
each round of a soft strategy, at least half of the messages
will not be received by Bob, so the size of the Alice’s
winning set will be reduced by at least 12 . Therefore with
i rounds of hard strategy and x− i rounds of a soft one,
the protocol successfully passes with ppass ≤ 2−i and if it
passes, Alice can cheat with probability ps,A ≤ NA2−x+i.
So in total the probability for Alice to successfully cheat
is bounded by
pA ≤ NA2−x. (5)
It is clear that we cannot always choose α and x in
such a way that both failure and cheating probabilities
will be low. As this protocol is only a subroutine, we will
have to carefully choose parameters NT , NA and NB in
order to allow the protocol to work correctly.
IV. 1-OUT-OF-2 OT PROTOCOL
Now we are ready to formulate the main protocol. In
the protocol both m0 and m1 are single bit messages
denoted b0 and b1. Let us denote B the choice of the
bit wished by Bob – if he wants to learn b0, he chooses
B = 0, otherwise he chooses B = 1.
1. Alice and Bob agree on the security parameters c
and β.
2. Alice first splits her messages b0 and b1 into groups
of random bits bj0 and b
j
1 such that
⊕c
j=1 b
j
0 = b0
and
⊕c
j=1 b
j
1 = b1.
3. For every pair bj0 and b
j
1, Alice chooses N single bit
messages r1, r2, ..., rN .
4. For each of these N messages, Alice uses the all-
or-nothing OT protocol to disclose them to Bob.
The protocol is terminated if Bob did not receive
at least n = N2 − β
√
N
2 messages.
5. Let us denote S the set of indices of messages that
Bob received correctly. Bob chooses n pairs of in-
dices {(ui, vi)}ni=1, such that ∀i, ui ∈ S if B = 0,
otherwise he chooses ∀i, vi ∈ S. Also, for each pair
Bob chooses a single random bit ki. If ki = 1, he
switches the order of the pair (ui, vi), otherwise he
keeps the order intact. After this operation, Bob
publishes the set of pairs, but keeps ki secret.
6. Alice and Bob use the element choosing protocol
described above with T being the set of pairs of
indices announced by Bob. Therefore, NT = n =
N
2 − β
√
N
2 . Let us denote the pair chosen h.
7. Bob announces the bit kh so that Alice can switch
the order of the selected pair if kh = 1; let us denote
the final key (u, v).
8. Alice sends bj0 ⊕ ru and bj1 ⊕ rv to Bob. Since he
knows one of the messages ru or rv, he can calculate
bjB of his choice.
9. Steps 2-6 are repeated c times for all pairs of bj0 and
bj1. To obtain bit bB in which Bob is interested, he
needs to learn all the bits bjB.
A. Probability of failure
The protocol can fail in two different parts. First, in
the step 4, Bob might receive less than n messages cor-
rectly. For honest parties this probability is bounded
by e−β
2/2 . In step 6 the element choosing protocol
might fail as well, with the probability (3) derived in
previous section. Plugging in NT = n we get pf <
2e−2ξ
2αxNT = 2e
−2ξ2αx
(
N
2 −β
√
N
2
)
, recalling ξ = 12 − α.
So the probability of failure in any particular round j of
the protocol is bounded by
pjf < e
−β2/2 + 2e−2ξ
2αx
(
N
2 −β
√
N
2
)
(6)
< e−β
2/2 + 2e−ξ
2αx N2
for
β ≤
√
N
2
, (7)
what is a condition on the parameters which will be taken
into account by choosing security parameters of the pro-
tocol. Further we can bound
pjf < e
−β2/2 + 2e−Nξ
22−x−1(1−xξ) (8)
using αx =
(
1
2 − ξ
)x
< 12x (1− xξ). Using another con-
dition on the parameters
ξ ≤ 1
2x
(9)
we get
pjf < e
−β2/2 + 2e−Nξ
22−x−2 . (10)
Thus the final probability to abort an honest protocol is
bounded by the sum of probability of failure for individ-
ual rounds reading
pf < c
(
e−β
2/2 + 2e−Nξ
22−x−2
)
. (11)
5B. Bob’s cheating
It is fairly hard for Bob to successfully cheat in the
protocol. To obtain both bits b0 and b1, he has to learn
both bits bj0 and b
j
1 in all c rounds of the main protocol.
Let us here analyze a single round j.
From honest Alice, Bob will successfully receive on av-
erage N2 messages, thus the probability that he receives
more than N2 +β
√
N
2 is less than e
−β . So with high prob-
ability, he can produce no more than NB = N4 + β
√
N
4
pairs of indices, where he received both corresponding
messages. Now he has to force the element choosing pro-
tocol to select one of these pairs, which happens with a
probability (4)
pjB =
NB2−x
NT αx
(12)
≤ (2α)−x
N
4 + β
√
N
4
N
2 − β
√
N
2
< (2α)
−x 1
2
1 + β√
N
1− β√
N
≤ (1− 2ξ)−x 2
3
for
β ≤
√
N
5
, (13)
what is just a more strict limitation on β comparing to
(7). Probability of cheating in all rounds of the protocol
is thus limited to
pB < (1− 2ξ)−cx
(
2
3
)c
. (14)
C. Alice’s cheating
For Alice the cheating is seemingly easier. It is enough
for her to learn the choice of Bob in a single round of the
protocol. She can do it by sending a portion of messages
that are unreadable to Bob. If one of these messages
appears as a pair (u, v) in one of the c instances of the
element choosing protocol in step 6, Alice learns that the
corresponding bit is not the one that Bob is interested
in.
Similarly to the case of Bob, Alice can send in each
round of the protocol not more than β
√
N garbage mes-
sages, otherwise the success probability will be lower than
e−β. She wins if she selects in the Element choosing pro-
tocol a pair where one of her garbage messages is present,
what happens with probability pjA ≤ β
√
N2−x. The to-
tal probability of cheating is upper bounded by the sum
of probabilities in each round
pA < cβ
√
N2−x. (15)
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Let us now analyze how to achieve security of the whole
protocol. We will define the protocol as secure, if the
probabilities of cheating of both Bob and Alice will be
bounded by a given constant ε
pA < cβ
√
N2−x ≤ ε, (16)
pB ≤ (1− 2ξ)−cx
(
2
3
)c
≤ ε. (17)
At the same time we expect the protocol to have a reason-
able chance to finish successfully if the parties are honest,
hence we expect
pf < c
(
e−β
2/2 + 2e−Nξ
22−x−2
)
≤ 1
2
. (18)
In the following paragraphs we will analyze these con-
ditions with the aim of finding a suitable choice of pa-
rameters that fulfill them. Equation (18) is satisfied if
both
ce−β
2/2 =
1
4
(19)
ce−Nξ
22−x−2 =
1
8
. (20)
From (19) we can set
β =
√
2 ln1/2 (4c) (21)
and from (20) we get
N = ln (8c) ξ−22x+2. (22)
Plugging these into (16) we get
c ln1/2 (8c) ln1/2 (4c) ξ−123/2−x/2 ≤ ε, (23)
which is satisfied if
ξ = c ln (8c) ε−123/2−x/2, (24)
where we used ln (8c) > ln (4c). This can be further
plugged into (17)[(
2
3
)(
1− c ln (8c) ε−125/2−x/2
)−x]c
≤ ε. (25)
Let us now analyze (25) in more detail. A part of this
inequality has the form
(
1− c ln (8c) ε−125/2−x/2
)−x
. (26)
Let us now, for a fixed choice of c and ε, implicitly define
x0 by
c ln (8c) ε−125/2−x0/2 =
1
4x0
. (27)
6Clearly, for fixed c and ε all x ≥ x0
c ln (8c) ε−125/2−x/2 ≤ 1
4x
. (28)
This is satisfied for all x ≥ x0 such that[(
2
3
)(
1− 1
4x
)−x]c
≤ ε. (29)
Further we know that for all x ≥ 1
e1/4 ≤
(
1− 1
4x
)−x
≤ 4
3
. (30)
Using this we can state that (25) will be satisfied for all
x > 1 if (
8
9
)c
≤ ε. (31)
Hence we can choose
c =
ln(ε)
ln (8/9)
. (32)
Plugging (32) back to (27) we get an implicit definition
of x
1
ε
ln(ε)
ln (8/9)
ln
(
8
ln(ε)
ln (8/9)
)
25/2−x/2 =
1
4x
, (33)
which can be efficiently solved numerically. We can fur-
ther plug (32) into (21) and get
β =
√
2 ln1/2
(
4
ln(ε)
ln (8/9)
)
. (34)
We also can use this result and (24) to define ξ
ξ =
1
ε
ln(ε)
ln (8/9)
ln
(
8
ln(ε)
ln (8/9)
)
23/2−x/2, (35)
which involves the numerical solution for x. For obtain-
ing a simpler formula we utilize (33) again and get
ξ =
1
8x
, (36)
thus fulfilling the condition (9). And finally we get the
solution for N by plugging everything into (22)
N = ln
(
8
ln(ε)
ln (8/9)
)
x222x+8. (37)
Comparing (34) and (37) it is obvious that (13) is satis-
fied for all x > 1.
This concludes the proof of the security of the protocol
– for a given ε, we can choose parameters of the protocol
according to (32-37) to be sure that the failure probabil-
ity will not be larger than 12 and cheating of both Alice
and Bob will be bounded by ε. It is important to stress
here that this choice is a mere proof of existence of suit-
able set of parameters of the protocol – if we would be
interested in efficient values, numerical search within the
constrains (16-18) would certainly be more appropriate.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Oblivious transfer protocols are important building
blocks in cryptography. Perfect all-or nothing OT pro-
tocol can be used to construct a 1-out-of-2 OT protocol
(and vice-versa), but this is in general not true for pro-
tocols with security security flaw as the one in [4]. And
as unconditionally secure OT protocols provably do not
exist, it is of utmost importance to investigate protocols
with security based on reasonable assumptions.
In this paper we have introduced an improved version
of the reduction protocol from all-or-nothing to 1-out-
of-2 OT protocol. Contrary to the existing results, this
reduction is immune against a security loophole in the
original protocol allowing Alice to learn partial one-sided
information in a small fraction of the protocol runs. This,
in particular, allows the use of the protocol suggested in
[4] for such a reduction. But our result is more general,
opening the possibility for utilizing other imperfect im-
plementations of all-or-nothing OT protocols as well.
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